Abstract
External evidence can make retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) more informative, yet retrieved passages also provide a path for adversarial instructions to enter the model context. We examine that path in an English-Indonesian RAG system and track cross-lingual indirect prompt injection separately at retrieval, reranking, and generation. The experiment starts from 75 semantic items and evaluates every item in eight query/body/payload language combinations, for 600 paired trials. Qwen3-Embedding-0.6B and BGE-M3 produce top-20 candidate sets, BGE-reranker-v2-m3 reduces each set to five documents, and Qwen3-0.6B answers from the resulting context with either a standard prompt or an explicit trust-boundary prompt. Statistical uncertainty is estimated by resampling semantic items, and paired binary outcomes are modeled with generalized estimating equations. Poison documents reached the top 20 in 80.50% of Qwen trials and 37.67% of BGE-M3 trials (odds ratio 6.94, 95% CI 4.53-10.63). Top-five exposure was 18.50% and 16.17%, respectively. Standard end-to-end attack success was 6.33% for Qwen and 6.00% for BGE-M3; boundary-aware prompting lowered both rates to 1.33%, with no canary false positives. The results indicate that multilingual RAG security depends on several linked stages rather than generation alone.
