Abstract:This study explores the application of the Value-Based Management (VBM) approach in analyzing the financial efficiency of renewable energy projects. As the global demand for clean and sustainable energy increases, renewable…
ble energy projects play a strategic role in the energy transition but are often faced with challenges of large initial investment, technological risks, and regulatory uncertainty. The results show that the application of VBM in evaluating renewable energy projects can improve the quality of investment decision making by considering both financial and non-financial aspects holistically. VBM encourages companies to be more selective and strategic in choosing projects that are not only economically feasible, but also socially and environmentally sustainable. In addition, this approach provides a strong framework for aligning managerial objectives with shareholder interests, improving corporate governance, and strengthening transparency in the process of evaluating and reporting project performance.
Abstract:The objective of this study is to ascertain the impact of the six elements of good corporate governance on the financial performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with risk management acting as a moderating variable.…
. This study employs annual reports on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in Appendix II of the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Regulation Number PER/MBU/03/2021. The sampling technique employed was purposive sampling, with a research sample comprising 57 SOEs selected from all SOEs for the 2018-2022 period. The data were analyzed using panel data regression analysis with the STATA 17. The results indicated that the Shareholder Aspect had a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of SOEs. In contrast, the aspects of Commitment to Sustainable GCG Implementation, Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, Disclosure and Transparency of Information, and other factors had no significant effect on the financial performance of SOEs. The findings indicate that risk management exerts a positive and significant influence on the relationship between the Board of Directors aspect and the financial performance of SOEs. Conversely, risk management exerts a negative and insignificant influence on the relationship between the Commitment to Sustainable GCG Implementation aspect, the Board of Commissioners, disclosure and transparency of information, and other factors and the financial performance of SOEs.
Abstract:The objective of this study is to ascertain the impact of the six elements of good corporate governance on the financial performance of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), with risk management acting as a moderating variable.…
. This study employs annual reports on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in Appendix II of the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises Regulation Number PER/MBU/03/2021. The sampling technique employed was purposive sampling, with a research sample comprising 57 SOEs selected from all SOEs for the 2018-2022 period. The data were analyzed using panel data regression analysis with the STATA 17. The results indicated that the Shareholder Aspect had a positive and significant effect on the financial performance of SOEs. In contrast, the aspects of Commitment to Sustainable GCG Implementation, Board of Commissioners, Board of Directors, Disclosure and Transparency of Information, and other factors had no significant effect on the financial performance of SOEs. The findings indicate that risk management exerts a positive and significant influence on the relationship between the Board of Directors aspect and the financial performance of SOEs. Conversely, risk management exerts a negative and insignificant influence on the relationship between the Commitment to Sustainable GCG Implementation aspect, the Board of Commissioners, disclosure and transparency of information, and other factors and the financial performance of SOEs.
Abstract:The agreement providing a corporate guarantee does not provide a limit on the nominal amount that will be guaranteed by the corporate guaranteed provider because the corporate guarantee provider will guarantee the entire…
debt including interest, fines, fees and other amounts of money that must be paid. In Indonesian limited liability company law, directors are required to seek shareholder approval in the case of pledging more than fifty percent of the company's assets, but in practice, approval from shareholders is not always required to provide a corporate guarantee. Especially in the case of corporate guarantees known as limited corporate guarantees, where the guarantee value does not exceed fifty percent of the Company's total assets. The aim of this research is to analyze the legal certainty of providing corporate guarantees without shareholder approval for credit applications whose value is less than fifty percent of the Company's assets. This type of research is normative juridical, namely a type of research with a conceptual approach. This research has the result that a corporate guaranteed agreement to guarantee the value of a credit facility whose value is not more than 50% of the company's assets provided without shareholder approval does not provide legal certainty.
Abstract:The Law Number 40 of 2007 Concerning Limited Liability Companies does not clearly forbid self-dealing transactions by the Board of Directors of Limited Liability Companies. The Board of Directors has a chance to engage in…
n self-dealing activities that are fraught with conflicts of interest if this ban doesn't exist, which could be detrimental to the company. The study is aimed at analyzing the legal safeguards for limited liability companies against the self-dealing activities of board of director members and the board's accountability for such activities that result in losses for limited liability companies. Legal, conceptual, and case-based research methods are combined to create normative legal research. Interviews, literature reviews, and document studies as data collection methods were used. This study concludes that the Law does not specifically forbid limited liability company board of directors self-dealing transactions. The availability of provisions in Book III of the Civil Code as lex generalist, the Limited Liability Companies Law itself as lex specialist, and the principles of Good Corporate Governance all provide legal protection for limited liability businesses from self-dealing transactions. Restrictively, the Law gives the Board of Directors, Board of Commissioners, and Shareholders the right to sue the Board of Directors in district court for any wrongdoing caused by the Board of Directors.
Abstract:This study analyzes the dividend policy of PT Telkom Indonesia (Persero) Tbk (TLKM) during the 2020–2025 period using a quantitative descriptive approach and a longitudinal case study based on secondary data from audited…
ed financial reports. The variables analyzed include Dividend Per Share (DPS), Earnings Per Share (EPS), Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR), Dividend Yield, and Free Cash Flow (FCF), with trend analysis using the Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR). The results show that DPS grows 6.05% per year, higher than EPS of 1.87%, resulting in DPR increasing from 80.00% to 93.95% in 2024. Nevertheless, strong and stable operating cash flow ensures that dividends remain supported by FCF, so there is no indication of financial distress. However, the increasing FCF-to-dividend ratio indicates the company's increasingly limited reinvestment space. The decline in net profit of 20.48% in 2025 also increases the risk of dividend policy sustainability. Furthermore, the increase in dividend yield was more influenced by stock price declines than dividend growth. This finding suggests that SOE dividend stability reflects not only fundamental performance but also institutional pressure from the government as the controlling shareholder, supporting the relevance of Agency Theory and Catering Theory in explaining dividend policy of state-owned enterprises in emerging markets
Abstract:This study investigates the role of acquisition premiums in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and their impact on shareholder wealth, focusing on five major Indian deals in pharmaceuticals, retail, banking, steel, and renewable…
able energy sectors. Potential synergies often justify acquisition premiums ranging from approximately 15% to 40% above target companies’ market values. However, market responses suggest that such premiums may not consistently result in value creation for acquiring firms' shareholders. Empirical findings reveal mixed outcomes: Sun Pharma’s acquisition of Ranbaxy led to a 9.8% share price increase within five days, while Tata Steel’s high-premium acquisition of Bhushan Steel saw only a 1.7% gain. In contrast, deals like Reliance–Future Retail and Tata Power–Welspun Power showed minimal or negative returns, despite sizable premiums. These patterns indicate that premium size alone is not a reliable predictor of post-deal shareholder wealth creation. The study concludes that M&A success depends more on strategic fit, market timing, and sectoral dynamics than on the premium offered. This analysis contributes to the broader M&A discourse by offering evidence-based insights into how premium valuations can either maximise or dilute shareholder value, aiding investors, corporate strategists, and policy analysts in deal assessment.
Abstract:This study investigates the role of acquisition premiums in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) and their impact on shareholder wealth, focusing on five major Indian deals in pharmaceuticals, retail, banking, steel, and renewable…
able energy sectors. Potential synergies often justify acquisition premiums ranging from approximately 15% to 40% above target companies’ market values. However, market responses suggest that such premiums may not consistently result in value creation for acquiring firms' shareholders. Empirical findings reveal mixed outcomes: Sun Pharma’s acquisition of Ranbaxy led to a 9.8% share price increase within five days, while Tata Steel’s high-premium acquisition of Bhushan Steel saw only a 1.7% gain. In contrast, deals like Reliance–Future Retail and Tata Power–Welspun Power showed minimal or negative returns, despite sizable premiums. These patterns indicate that premium size alone is not a reliable predictor of post-deal shareholder wealth creation. The study concludes that M&A success depends more on strategic fit, market timing, and sectoral dynamics than on the premium offered. This analysis contributes to the broader M&A discourse by offering evidence-based insights into how premium valuations can either maximise or dilute shareholder value, aiding investors, corporate strategists, and policy analysts in deal assessment
Abstract:This study aims to assess the financial performance of PT Global Teleshop Tbk for the period 2017–2021 based on liquidity, profitability, solvency, and activity ratio analysis. The research uses a descriptive qualitative…
ve method. The population consists of the financial statements of PT Global Teleshop Tbk, with the sample being the company's financial reports from the last five years (2017–2021). The data analysis uses financial ratios. The results show that: (1) The liquidity ratio analysis indicates good financial performance, as shown by the increasing Current Ratio (CR) and Quick Ratio (QR), demonstrating the company's improving ability to meet short-term liabilities with liquid current assets, although the QR still falls into the less optimal category; (2) The profitability ratio analysis indicates poor performance, with low Net Profit Margin (NPM) and Return on Equity (ROE), showing the company's limited ability to generate profits from shareholders' funds; (3) The solvency ratio analysis shows weak financial performance, with Debt to Asset Ratio (DAR) and Debt to Equity Ratio (DER) indicating the company’s inability to cover total liabilities with its assets; (4) The activity ratio analysis, based on Total Asset Turnover (TATO) and Working Capital Turnover (WCT), also suggests poor performance due to declining asset turnover and ineffective management of working capital.
Abstract:Beneficial Owner or beneficial owner in Presidential Decree Number 13 of 2018, explained as holder power and authority the highest one has control full towards the Corporation as a GMS. Based on his rights as regulated…
� in Presidential Decree Number 13 of 2018 , Beneficial Owners have equal standing with Major Shareholders who have shares , rights sound and get profit more of the 25% where has exceeding the ownership limit share holder share main namely at least 20% in the company . Corporations are often used as tool somebody For avoid not quite enough answer disclosure origin treasure riches as well as use assets . Misuse ownership benefit can harm holder share minorities , employees , creditors , and lead to crime businesses that are detrimental to the country, such as act criminal corruption , crime criminal money laundering , crime criminal funding terrorism , and others . The role of notaries in recognize Owner Sorry in Corporations , have obligation For to apply principle recognize Owner Benefits done through identification , verification and monitoring towards the Corporation as user service as regulated in Presidential Decree Number 13 of 2018 and Perkumham Number 15 of 2019. However , in reality matter the Not yet can implemented in a way maximum because of its complexity structure ownership in a Corporation and No existence clarity position about Beneficial Owner or beneficial owner in UUPT, apart from That Still many Corporations as user services that are still Not yet cooperative in give information related The Beneficial Owner is the real . Vacancy law related position Beneficial Owner or beneficial owner in a Corporation because Still Not yet there is arrangement legislation that regulates in a way clear and specific .